Showing posts with label SOX. Show all posts
Showing posts with label SOX. Show all posts

Wednesday, September 2, 2009

Backdating is still kicking around (Broadcom and Reyes): what is it, exactly?

AmLaw ran a post yesterday discussing the recent Broadcom settlement in the derivative suit alleging stock option backdating (reported as historically one of the largest settlement amounts). And late last month, reports were rampant about the unending litigation involved with the Brocade Communications backdating matter (It’s over! *Psyche* Those cases collectively create their own “Never Ending Story”). Only briefly: there, a federal appeals court overturned the criminal conviction of CEO Reyes. I have done research on the options backdating scandals that hit in 2006, and the petering litigation that has followed (though more frequently, settlements). These news stories catch my eye because of that context, although before such, I only had a passing familiarity with what stock option backdating was. Assuming some of our readers may be in a similar position, I wanted to offer a brief skeleton of what backdating entails.

Corporate compensation frequently includes equity-based stock option grants. Stock option grants are typically a component of executive and managerial compensation, but are also given to employees throughout the corporate structure as a means of incentive and creating a vested interest in the corporation's pursuits. When the grant is given, it creates within the recipient the right to purchase a specific number of stocks at a specific exercise price on a specific date. Many stock options are granted “at-the-money.” This describes the exercise price being equal to the current fair market price of the stock on the day of the grant. “In-the-money” options, on the other hand, describe the exercise price being lower than the fair market price of the stock on the day of the grant. Backdating is the act of changing the grant date to an earlier date so that the exercise price is lower than the fair market stock price on the day of the proper grant. Backdating can occur either at the time the grant is written, or retroactively after the grant is written.

If I have adequately explained this, the affect is apparent: recipients of backdated options stand to gain more money that was originally granted; that is, between the lower backdated price and the higher grant date price.

Backdating in-and-of-itself is not illegal. Backdating is legal when done with board authorization, in full disclosure, and in compliance with applicable accounting and tax provisions. And there’s the hiccup … or the dozen different hiccups. For example, as regards taxes: at-the-money stock options are considered performance-based. Performance-based awards do not count towards a corporation’s one million dollar executive compensation deduction cap under IRS Code § 162(m). In-the-money options, on the other hand, are not considered performance-based as specifically regards the difference between the low exercise price and the higher fair market price of the stock on the day of the grant. That difference in price, then, counts towards the one million dollar deduction under § 162(m). The rub: corporations may have taken full deductions on amounts that should have been limited.

After the jump: GAAP and SOX hiccups discussed.

Another frequent example of where backdating may go wrong is in regards to financial statements represented as “GAAP compliant.” To be so compliant, a corporation must record in-the-money stock options as a compensation expense. The expensed amount is, again, the difference between the lower price of the stock on the day the option is exercised and the higher fair market price of the stock on the day it was properly granted. If this expense was not properly recorded during the financial period it was incurred, a corporation may need to restate its financial statements. Uber problematic: options are accounted for over the course of their vesting period, which typically entails a period of several years. This translates into multiple restatements to accommodate that same several year period.

Also the subject of possible fraud allegations: SOX compliance and the Compensation Discussion & Analysis (“CD&A”). The CD&A requires the corporation to publicly articulate in detail executive compensation packages; objectives to meet, elements used to incentivize performance. It will include information, such as the exercise date that stock option grants are given. Backdating a grant to an earlier exercise date would obviously alter this information. Keep in mind the CD&A is filed with the SEC, and therefore subject to both the ’33 and ’34 Acts. It is also shared publicly via the corporation's proxy statement.

FWIW – happy starter primer. Sls.


Photo credit: Irving Underhill.
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Sunday, July 26, 2009

SOX § 304’s Clawback: Executive Fraud Not Required

Last week, the SEC filed a complaint in the District Court of Arizona to compel former CEO of CSK Auto Corporation, Maynard Jenkins, to disgorge over $ 4 million in bonuses and equity compensation. Since SOX's inception in 2002, § 304 has been used only a handful of times. This complaint is notable in that it marks the first time § 304 has been used to clawback executive compensation from a defendant who has no other securities fraud allegations pending against him. The move on the SEC's part is significant and warrants a background discussion.

Section 304 is subject to a number of significant limitations. The most substantial of which is the statute's broad language. For instance, the clawback function of § 304 disgorges executive compensation in the instance of "misconduct." Misconduct, however, is not defined by statute. Case law up to this point has provided a fairly narrow definition of what "misconduct" is. In SEC v. McGuire, former CEO and Chairman of UnitedHealth Group, William McGuire, settled with the SEC for $ 468 million to resolve allegations of personal involvement in a lengthy stock-option backdating scheme. In SEC v. Brooks, former CEO and Chairman of DHB Industries, David Brooks, was alleged to have overstated inventory values, falsified journal entries, and failed to charge obsolete inventory - all of which portrayed a false gross profit margin to the public. Brooks was also alleged to have misused corporate monies and to have engaged in insider trading. Apart from the factual allegations, both McGuire and Brooks involved a § 304 action to clawback executive compensation against an executive who had securities fraud allegations leveled against him personally. This is substantially different from the SEC's complaint last week against Jenkins.

There, in fact, are no personal allegations of securities fraud against Jenkins. The SEC has been chasing CSK's financial misconduct for several months. In March of this year, the SEC charged a number of officers with securities fraud. And again in May, the SEC instituted settled cease-and-desist proceedings against CSK for making public false financial statements. The SEC complaint last week against Jenkins compels disgorgement of his executive compensation for the periods of CSK's alleged financial fraud. A lay-instinct may be to indicate that Jenkins in fact signed CSK financial statements, and therefore despite not having allegations of securities fraud leveled against him, he is yet responsible to the extent of his SOX Certifications. It is widely held as consensus by the courts, however, that SOX Certifications alone do not constitute scienter. (n.1). The move on the SEC's part to try and clawback Jenkin's executive compensation despite and withal this, is fairly bold. I am sure I am not alone in wondering if this will be a secluded event.

Before closing, I want to briefly suggest to you other significant § 304 limitations.


  • It is insufficient for the "misconduct" to have merely occurred, or to even have been known of; a financial restatement must be publicly released (or, so says the case law).
  • It is only the executive compensation of a corporation's properly named CEO and CFO that is subject to the clawback provision.
  • Any bonus and equity compensation received one year following the "misconduct" is subject to clawback; salary excluded. Any profit earned from the sale of issuer securities sold one year following the "misconduct" is also subject to clawback.
  • Other vague statutory language, not yet resolved by the courts, includes: "required [to prepare]" (when must an issuer restate its financials: upon auditor suggestion? SEC opinion letter?); "material noncompliance" (as regards "misconduct"); "received" and "profits" (as regards when executive compensation is in fact received by the executive, and do you use the sale price or the acquisition price to determine stock sale profits?).
  • No private right of action.
  • No retroactive award (prior to SOX's 2002 enactment).
  • Disgorged proceeds are reimbursed to the corporate issuer, and not to any collection of shareholders, or other plaintiffs.

(n.1). In re Intelligroup Secs. Litig., 468 F. Supp. 2d 670, 707, complaint dismissed, 527 F. Supp. 2d 262 (D.N.J. 2007).

Hat tip: former Guest Blawger,
Allen Major.

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