Sunday, July 26, 2009

SOX § 304’s Clawback: Executive Fraud Not Required

Last week, the SEC filed a complaint in the District Court of Arizona to compel former CEO of CSK Auto Corporation, Maynard Jenkins, to disgorge over $ 4 million in bonuses and equity compensation. Since SOX's inception in 2002, § 304 has been used only a handful of times. This complaint is notable in that it marks the first time § 304 has been used to clawback executive compensation from a defendant who has no other securities fraud allegations pending against him. The move on the SEC's part is significant and warrants a background discussion.

Section 304 is subject to a number of significant limitations. The most substantial of which is the statute's broad language. For instance, the clawback function of § 304 disgorges executive compensation in the instance of "misconduct." Misconduct, however, is not defined by statute. Case law up to this point has provided a fairly narrow definition of what "misconduct" is. In SEC v. McGuire, former CEO and Chairman of UnitedHealth Group, William McGuire, settled with the SEC for $ 468 million to resolve allegations of personal involvement in a lengthy stock-option backdating scheme. In SEC v. Brooks, former CEO and Chairman of DHB Industries, David Brooks, was alleged to have overstated inventory values, falsified journal entries, and failed to charge obsolete inventory - all of which portrayed a false gross profit margin to the public. Brooks was also alleged to have misused corporate monies and to have engaged in insider trading. Apart from the factual allegations, both McGuire and Brooks involved a § 304 action to clawback executive compensation against an executive who had securities fraud allegations leveled against him personally. This is substantially different from the SEC's complaint last week against Jenkins.

There, in fact, are no personal allegations of securities fraud against Jenkins. The SEC has been chasing CSK's financial misconduct for several months. In March of this year, the SEC charged a number of officers with securities fraud. And again in May, the SEC instituted settled cease-and-desist proceedings against CSK for making public false financial statements. The SEC complaint last week against Jenkins compels disgorgement of his executive compensation for the periods of CSK's alleged financial fraud. A lay-instinct may be to indicate that Jenkins in fact signed CSK financial statements, and therefore despite not having allegations of securities fraud leveled against him, he is yet responsible to the extent of his SOX Certifications. It is widely held as consensus by the courts, however, that SOX Certifications alone do not constitute scienter. (n.1). The move on the SEC's part to try and clawback Jenkin's executive compensation despite and withal this, is fairly bold. I am sure I am not alone in wondering if this will be a secluded event.

Before closing, I want to briefly suggest to you other significant § 304 limitations.


  • It is insufficient for the "misconduct" to have merely occurred, or to even have been known of; a financial restatement must be publicly released (or, so says the case law).
  • It is only the executive compensation of a corporation's properly named CEO and CFO that is subject to the clawback provision.
  • Any bonus and equity compensation received one year following the "misconduct" is subject to clawback; salary excluded. Any profit earned from the sale of issuer securities sold one year following the "misconduct" is also subject to clawback.
  • Other vague statutory language, not yet resolved by the courts, includes: "required [to prepare]" (when must an issuer restate its financials: upon auditor suggestion? SEC opinion letter?); "material noncompliance" (as regards "misconduct"); "received" and "profits" (as regards when executive compensation is in fact received by the executive, and do you use the sale price or the acquisition price to determine stock sale profits?).
  • No private right of action.
  • No retroactive award (prior to SOX's 2002 enactment).
  • Disgorged proceeds are reimbursed to the corporate issuer, and not to any collection of shareholders, or other plaintiffs.

(n.1). In re Intelligroup Secs. Litig., 468 F. Supp. 2d 670, 707, complaint dismissed, 527 F. Supp. 2d 262 (D.N.J. 2007).

Hat tip: former Guest Blawger,
Allen Major.

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Friday, July 24, 2009

In Case You Missed It This Week

  • Fickle (adj.): ever-changing; like the weather, or the American Public. The Glom.

  • "Your Honor, my client has no money to pay his creditors ..." Law.com.

  • Coercive penal confinement of up to 14 years for contempt of court is apparently okay. Lowering the Bar.

  • Executive Compensation has also contributed to Global Warming and Child Hunger. TaxProf Blog.

  • Slipperly slope, Obama style. NYLJ (free registration required to view).

(Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons).

Wednesday, July 22, 2009

Healthcare Reform

I listened with great interest to President Obama’s health care speech tonight. No domestic issue more concerns me at this time. Economic recovery, education, and mass transit are all very important, but now is the time to focus on meaningful change to our health care system.


Any reform, however, should address coverage qualities currently lacking, particularly accessibility to all, portability, and economic viability. First, universal accessibility should be achieved. Health care should not be rationed based purely on ability to pay. Objections of fairness aside, most Americans could easily find themselves one bad day away from being cut off from essential medical care. This is a utilitarian argument. Second, our access to health care should not be contingent upon employment. Keeping my health care even if I lose or change my job would greatly enhance my ability to choose from a greater variety of employment opportunities. It would be easier for people to choose to work at small firms or non-profits if medical plans were independent of employment, adding much needed flexibility to our economy. Finally, it should be economically viable. What I mean by this is that the overall proportion of our GDP dedicated to health care should fall. Spending up to 18% of our national income on health care is far too much. Every 1% drop in that proportion frees up more than $140 billion to be reallocated to other (assumed) more productive uses. That’s more than $450 in savings for every U.S. citizen. If we spent in proportion to what Germany spends, that amount increases to more than $2,800 for every American.


Critics of the public option are again talking up the prospect of introducing more market based competition to drive value for U.S. consumers. Professors Michael Porter and Elizabeth Olmsted Tiesberg argued persuasively for a renewed effort in creating health care competition in their 2004 HBR article “Redefining Competition in Health care.” As one who believes in the power of the free market to drive better living standards, I find this position ideologically attractive. But the history of healthcare reform suggests otherwise. Attempts to introduce market based incentives have ended in dismal failure. How competitive a market is is a matter of national importance. Health care, for a variety of reasons, is not competitive. Because of this, we need government intervention and action in the form of a public plan.


I am willing to pay a higher share of my income in taxes in return for a health care system with the qualities outlined above. I am heartened by President Obama’s strong push towards health care reform. Let’s hope that he is successful in achieving his twin goals of reducing cost and increasing coverage. That would be forward movement indeed.

Litigating the Credit Rating Agencies

AmLawDaily is among the media outlets that reported CalPERS filed a suit alleging negligent misrepresentation against Moody’s, Standard & Poors (via The McGraw Hill Companies), and Fitch. The suit – the first by a pension fund against a credit rating agency - also alleges that each rating agency played a role in the structuring of the investment vehicles. The litigation was filed in California state court, alleging violations of both the California Civil Code and California common law. The short of it: CalPERS (which manages $ 173 billion in assets) invested in structured finance vehicles that defendant rating agencies denoted as AAA; the subprime crisis revealed the vehicles were in fact not AAA, and CalPERS is seeking recompense of its lost investment.

There appears to be a consensus that the rating agencies will successfully plead their ratings are an expression of their First Amendment rights, and the CalPERS suit will be dismissed. Really? I am both a young attorney and new to the matter, so was surprised when I discovered that the rating agencies are not only subsidized by the federal government, but also receive compensation from the firms whose instruments they rate. Frank Pasquale at Co-Op has a great post on the topic. I am really intrigued by the issue, and so investigated what litigation in New York is among that pending against these actors.

In In re Moody’s Corp. Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 493, reconsideration denied, 612 F. Supp. 2d 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), plaintiff investors filed a class action against the rating agency and several of its officers and directors, alleging a variety of misrepresentations in violation of the Exchange Act § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Among the misrepresentations Moody’s is alleged to have made: as regards the independence of both itself as a rating agency and the ratings it released, in light of interested issuers of securities; as regards the meaning of Moody’s ratings themselves; as regards Moody’s structured finance revenue; and as regards its rating methodologies. Although I will not address such in this post, plaintiffs also alleged control person liability against individual defendants, under Exchange Act § 20(A). On defendant motion, the Court dismissed all allegations against defendant COO and Managing Director of Moody’s U.S. Asset Finance Group, and allegations regarding the meaning of Moody’s ratings and Moody’s structured finance revenue (meaning and derivation). The remaining claims proceeded to trial, and plaintiffs were otherwise left with leave to amend.

Although only an opinion on a motion to dismiss, it’s interesting to review what happened. The Court found plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence that Moody’s statements about its independence were indeed false. The Court relied on a number of WSJ articles that described events such as: Moody’s changing a rating so as to save a client issuer; and promotion of analysts who favored higher ratings and asked fewer questions. In finding so, the Court rejected defendant’s puffery argument; that language was “vague” and “non-specific.” The Court considered precedent which had ruled puffery as inactionable; language there took the form of declarations of intent and discussion of hope. Moody’s, on the other hand, was found to have treated its independence as a “cornerstone” of its very livelihood, and the Court found several public statements made by Moody’s to be neither “vague” or “non-specific.” The case is yet pending in the Southern District Court of New York, 07 CV. 8375 (SWK).

The topic is hot, not to mention interesting. As a new attorney to the issue, there are loads of topics to research and discuss, so I will certainly revisit the topic as the blawg moves forward (no pun on that last bit … ). Thanks – Sls.

(Image courtesy of Bank of the Ryukyus, Limited).
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Tuesday, July 21, 2009

Jack Welch: Legal Constructivist or Bully?

I am not a legal theorist (Olga?!), and not particularly enthusiastic about the comments this post might illicit, but I felt compelled to write. Last week Jack Welch remarked at a SHRM event that female professionals had the burden of making a choice: to focus on acquiring a leadership position within their company and field, or, to focus on having and raising children.

I didn’t pay much attention to the news item at the time of its release – then, it wasn't blawgable. In the interim period, the online community has been both critical and supportive of Welch (ie, ABA, Ms. JD, WSJ). The reason the news story originally sailed passed my attention is ironically the reason I write now, because I feel Welch merely remarked on the roadmap every female professional realizes exists.

I will not discuss whether this roadmap is “right,” or “fair,” or a choice a man is under the same obligation to make. But from a legal constructivist position, Welch’s comments make sense. Legal constructivism studies how law embodies norms. It makes sense, that a woman competing in any profession built by men, and for decades professionally populated by men, would have to compete by the rules those men created. And whether purposefully or subconsciously, those men would create rules that reinforced the manner in which they performed, the means by which their performance was judged, and by values their male community supported. So where a male professional had sacrificed his personal interests for the sake of his company’s interests (or alternatively, did not have to make the sacrifice because a partner supported him), it is logical that a promotion and company leadership structure would embody the same rationale, priority, and reward.


As a closing matter, Welch’s comments also make intuitive sense. If I join an athletic team, and leave work early each evening to practice, travel periodically for games, and have my mental focus divided among competing concerns, no one – not even myself – would expect a professional leadership position at work. And this is not to denigrate raising children to the level of playing baseball, but the issues of distraction and divided focus from company concerns remain the same. We grew up as kids knowing we couldn’t have it all, right? That our choices and actions had consequences? (And this is a personal and truthful reflection): why, then, does it come as such a shock when Jack Welch says it out loud?

(Photo courtesy of Re:Focus).
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Sunday, July 19, 2009

The Waste Claim for Recouping Executive Pay under Delaware Law

Stephanie has discussed a bit the difficulty in successfully making the waste claim in New York for recouping executive pay. It is similarly difficult to win under a claim for waste in Delaware. The Delaware Court has said that to prevail on waste, “the plaintiff must overcome the general presumption of good faith by showing that the board’s decision was so egregious or irrational that it could not have been based on a valid assessment of the corporation’s best interests.” White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 554 n.36 (Del. 2001). Surely a high hurdle to meet. A former professor of mine gave a clear example of waste: collecting the company’s cash and setting it aflame.

While the Board of Directors of a Delaware corporation has broad discretion in setting executive pay, the law is clear that there is an outer limit to this discretion, at which point a pay package constitutes waste. A recent decision by Chancellor Chandler of the Delaware Chancery Court (In Re Citigroup Inc. Shareholders Derivative Litigation, Civil Action No. 3338-CC, Del. Ch., Feb. 24, 2009) provides at least a little bit of hope for shareholders seeking to recoup executive pay from executives at poorly-performing companies that provide lavish executive pay packages.

In November 2007, Citigroup entered into a letter agreement with its then-CEO, Charles Prince, which provided Prince with $68 million upon his departure from the company including bonus, salary and accumulated stockholdings. Additionally, Prince was provided with an office, an administrative assistant, and a car and driver. In return, he contracted to sign a non-compete agreement, a non-disparagement agreement, a non-solicitation agreement, and a release of claims against the Company. Shareholders sued claiming that the pay package was so one-sided that it amounted to waste because Prince was paid millions even though he was allegedly responsible, in part, for billions of dollars of losses at Citigroup. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.

In a decision handed down on February 24, 2009, Chancellor Chandler denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim for waste. He noted that he was left with very little information regarding (1) how much additional compensation Prince actually received as a result of the letter agreement and (2) the real value, if any, of the various promises given by Prince. Without more information and taking plaintiffs’ well pleaded allegations as true, the Chancellor concluded that there was reasonable doubt as to whether the letter agreement constituted waste.

The waste claim was part of a broader lawsuit where shareholders alleged that Citigroup officers and directors breached fiduciary duties by failing to adequately protect the company from exposure to the subprime lending market. Other than the waste claim relating to Prince’s pay package, all the claims were dismissed.

The decision for the plaintiffs on the waste claim is admittedly at an early stage of the litigation. Discovery is ongoing. If the waste claim is to be decided on its merits, it will be interesting to see whether the Delaware court maintains the high hurdle that plaintiffs must meet to satisfy the waste test or provides an opening for future plaintiffs to succeed on a claim for corporate waste.

Introducing Guest Blawger, Zachary Williams

I am pleased to introduce Zachary Williams, he will be guest blawging with us for the next month. Zach comes to Forward Movement with great writing credentials. As an undergrad, he was Managing Editor for his college's official newspaper, the Davidsonian, and also contributed to a school-acknowledged blog. As a law student, he was an Editorial Staff Member and published a journal article with The American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) Quarterly Journal, Hometaping in the 21st Century: Updating the Audio Home Recording Act to Address Emerging Technologies, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 77 (2008). He also administered and wrote his own personal blog.

Zach studied political science and graduated from Davidson College. He is also a graduate of The George Washington University Law School. He is licensed to practice in Virginia, and currently resides in the Washington D.C. metro area. He is currently acting as a Coordinating Editor for a media distribution group. Included among his current professional associations is his pro bono work for Legal Services of Northern Virginia.

Welcome, Zach! Am pleased you'll be writing and I'm excited to see what you will do here.

Introducing Guest Blawger, "Econoclastic"

Mr. Econoclastic, Sir Econoclastic, "EC"? ... this Guest Author will have to clarify his pseudonym when he posts next, but suffice it for now to indicate some details of his professional accomplishments will be hidden for the sake of Econoclastic's own business plans, and employment security with his current firm. I am really quite pleased, however, that he has agreed to write with us despite such pressure: he is our first MBA blawger, and a friend from a previous degree. Too, given his ongoing debate of opening his own shop, I am interested in the topics and details he'll discuss on this site.

Econoclastic works in Manhattan and lives within the Five Boroughs of New York City. He graduated from Temple University's Fox School of Business and Management, studying Economics. He is also a recent graduate of a Top 10 MBA program. Econoclastic currently works within the financial services industry, and among the professional organizations he remains active in is the Beta Gamma Sigma Honor Society and Alumni Group in New York City.

Welcome, Econoclastic! Am glad you're joining us for the next month, and I'm excited to read your posts!

Friday, July 17, 2009

In Case You Missed It This Week

Product endorsement and Team Obama. Althouse.

And now firms' summer programs are being cancelled altogether?! ATL.

Has-been pop star Brandy has settled litigation arising from her 2006 car accident, and the death it caused. PerezHilton.

The Hobbit Family wants its money. Bloomberg.

Cap and Trade is still confusing some of our political officials. Wonkette.

"Twittergate." BBC.

The real transcript of Former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson before Congress this week. DealBreaker.

(Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons).

Thursday, July 16, 2009

Executive compensation passé? United Kingdom doesn't think so.

Last week AIG announced it was making bonus payments for various employees' 2008 performance. Treasury spokespeople commented about Compensation Czar Feinberg's approach to the matter, but given his 2009 appointment, any intervention he may attempt would be considered retroactive and inappropriate. AIG's announcement garnered little attention, as did the news of Goldman Sachs' intention to pay higher executive compensation in light of the firm's recent earnings release.

And so Politico wonders, "Where's the outrage?" In the United Kingdom, apparently. United Kingdom Prime Minister Gordon Brown has announced the U.K. government will adopt laws that will withhold bonuses paid to traders and executives, for a period of up to five years. In fairness, the move does echo public statements made by U.S. Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner and House Financial Services Committee Chair Barney Frank (D - Mass): alter the incentivizing structure of finance professionals to temper their risk-taking; to promote a more long-term approach to finance. It is also reported Brown supports proposals to limit trader compensation to amounts earned by the bank's board members, and to compel banks to publicly disclose trader compensation (though in anonymous "bands"). Although the U.K. committed public funds to assist a handful of financial actors in the recent economic snap - $ 2.3 trillion - the laws and proposals would be applicable to all financial institutions based in the U.K., as well as foreign-owned firms with operations in Britain.

The proposals are contained in a report commissioned by the U.K. government and written by former executive director of the Bank of England, Sir David Walker. Among the internal governance suggestions Walker makes: change the culture of the banking industry by promoting non-executive directors. These non-executive directors, screened by the British regulator (FSA), would chair the banks' risk committees and be a counter weight - in American parlance, a check and balance - to the banks' CEOs.

Walker will continue his investigation and analysis through the summer and fall, submitting a final November 2009 report. There is no reported timeline for Brown's anticipated bonus hold-back legislation.

Tuesday, July 14, 2009

Higher Academic Honors

As my time on this blog is coming to its inevitable and very depressing end, I try to keep my eye on the Big Picture. Yesterday, legal giant Richard Posner likewise advocated a farther-reaching, cross-disciplinary approach to law and society here. In his article, Posner laments the “academification”/specialization of legal research and writing, and specifically argues that the lack of academic focus on macro-economic issues by legal scholars is “inimical to research oriented to practical solutions to current legal [and economic] problems.” Posner follows with specific legal questions (e.g.: should bankruptcy judges rewrite mortgages?).


Posner’s specific legal questions get at the following themes: should rules of contract/bankruptcy law bend in times of economic crisis, and if so, should they bend through a legislative or a judicial process? Are there constitutional limitations to how far they can bend? From a policy perspective, is it wise for rules to bend/ be subject to bending during otherwise unstable times? Posner argues that “the impact of the [ ] resolution [of these questions] on the macroeconomy” would be extremely valuable, if not essential, to lasting economic (and legal) health.


To Posner’s points I would add that consideration of these questions by legal scholars could also shed light on some traditional debates about the very nature of the legal process. Anchoring Posner’s query of whether judges ought to have the power to rewrite mortgages (as opposed to the legislature passing a bill affecting certain mortgages) in a larger, traditional legal and political debate regarding the role of judges in society could breathe new life into the latter (bigger) context, with important practical consequences for how we select Supreme Court justices, select and rate judges, manage the legislative process, and interpret or change the U.S. Constitution. Ideas beget innovation. Because reinvigorating some older debates like the one about the role and power of the U.S. Supreme Court, or the one about the respective responsibilities of judges versus legislators, or the one about the propriety and sufficiency of methods for amending the U.S. Constitution, could indeed usher in meaningful legal and political innovations that could be substantially better equipped to grapple with the complex dynamic of the contemporary world than are our current (and unchallenged) traditional notions about such topics. For these reasons, I'm with Posner: the key to lasting legal and political health is in the minds and papers of academic legal researchers and writers, who should aspire towards bigger, higher, more complex and cross-disciplinary planes.

FCPA: Conscious Disregard is Knowledge

This weekend’s news covered a Friday verdict from the Southern District Court of New York that found Frederick Bourke guilty of conspiring under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”). Broadly, the FCPA prohibits American businesses from making payments to foreign officials for the purpose of doing business. Despite character witness Former Senator George Mitchell, jurors found Bourke conspired with his business partners to bribe Azerbaijan officials so as to effectuate control of a state-run oil company. Jurors found Bourke had knowledge of the payments, or alternatively, should have known of the payments. The discussion online suggests the due diligence responsibilities of American business under the FCPA is now much broader.

The FCPA applies to actors on behalf of the American business (this includes employees, agents, and shareholders). A successful anti-bribery claim requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, among other things, that defendant knew that something of value was being offered to a foreign official. This knowledge element need not be actual; it could in fact be acquiesance or conscious disregard. What factual evidence constituted Bourke’s knowledge, or conscious disregard of, in this case? There was the tape: a 1998 conversation between Bourke and an investor discussing possible corporate structures to avoid civil and criminal liability, that included the topic of bribes. This corporate structure later arranged and paid for recipient Azerbaijan officials to fly to NYC for medical treatment. Bourke’s false statements to the FBI in 2002 regarding payments probably didn’t help the matter … There was also testimony: two of Bourke’s business partners – who in fact directly participated in the illegal payments – testified that Bourke knew his investment monies were going to Azerbaijan officials. The fact that both witnesses already plead guilty with prosecutors, or that the timing of some of the dates testified to were inconsistent, did not dissuade jurors of Bourke’s knowledge. If anything, jurors interviewed later said they found Bourke just simply should have known about the illegal payments; “he’s an investor[;] it’s his job to know.”

Sentencing is scheduled for October of this year; appeal is anticipated.

(Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons).

Monday, July 13, 2009

Ghostbusters' Legal Arm: Taking a Genie to Task

It was reported over the weekend that a Saudi Arabian family is pursuing litigation in a Shari'ah court against an unnamed genie. The complaint alleges theft and harassment (including throwing objects). The family has relocated their residence pending the outcome of the suit. Genies are represented in Western culture as generous, amicable beings. Islamic theology, however, describes genies as capable of being either good or evil.

The family is getting a pretty hard shake in this morning's news, but this sounds remarkably like a Western poltergeist or haunting action. Yes - we have them in the U.S., too.

In Stambovksy v. Ackley, the Court granted an equitable recission, relieving plaintiff from performance under a contract to purchase real estate. The Court found plaintiff, an out-of-town buyer, had no means to discover the house's haunted reputation. A reputation and condition, the Court felt, the defendant had created over time. And that whether the haunting was "parapsychic or psychogenic," the defendant was estopped from contesting the ghosts; "as a matter of law, the house [was] haunted." This reputation caused a dimunition in the house's value, and went to the heart of the contract. The Court returned plaintiff's down payment.

In Hansen v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue (n. 1), plaintiffs sought tax relief, arguing their First Amendment Establishment rights were violated by a "demonic" government computer system acting within Biblical prophecies. Procedurally, the complaint failed, because the plaintiffs named non-governmental parties as defendants, and separately, because the Eleventh Amendment bars federal suit seeking money damages against a state. In dicta, the Court addressed the substance of plaintiff's complaint, assuring plaintiffs the computer system named "Lucifer" did not constitute government endorsement of a particular religion.

And "the" fallen angel himself has been named as defendant in a suit. In U.S. ex rel. Mayo v. Satan & His Staff, plaintiff alleged a violation of his civil rights; that the defendant had caused him "misery" and his ultimate "downfall." The Court denied the in forma pauperis request, and indicated the action was not one upon which relief could be granted. The Court reasoned that personal jurisdiction over the defendant was questionable, and further, was not plead in the complaint. The Court also wondered whether it was more appropriate to proceed with the litigation as a class action.

FWIW: How's that for light discourse on a Monday afternoon?


(n. 1) Hansen v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37936 (W.D. Wis. 2006).

Friday, July 10, 2009

In Case You Missed It This Week


No one knows what now-Governor Palin is doing, apart from Levi Johnston. Washington Post.

I fought the law, and the law won [with the help of "wealth porn"]. WSJ.

Governments ban child pornography, domestic violence, and ... bottled water. Associated Press.

I would gladly employ you in 2012 for a job well-done this summer. ATL.

Every time I walk past this location, I wonder why it is still - literally - a hole in the ground. AmLawLitigationDaily.


(Photo courtesy of Sound & Fury).

Wednesday, July 8, 2009

The Compensation Czar

Last month, the Obama administration announced the appointment of Kenneth Feinberg (photo at left) as the Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation (the “Special Master,” commonly referred to as the “compensation czar”). At the seven firms that have received “exceptional assistance” from the government - AIG, Citigroup, Bank of America, Chrysler, GM, GMAC and Chrysler Financial - the Special Master must determine whether the compensation payments and structure for the senior executive officers and the twenty next most highly compensated employees may result in payments that are inconsistent with the purposes of TARP or contrary to the public interest. Additionally, regarding any remaining executive officers and the 100 most highly compensated employees, the Special Master must determine whether the compensation structures may result in payments that are inconsistent with the purposes of TARP or contrary to the public interest. The Special Master may also render advisory opinions on his own initiative as to whether compensation payments or structures at any TARP recipient meet the appropriate standards.

Whenever the Special Master reviews compensation payments or structures for consistency with the purposes of TARP or conformity with the public interest, he must consider the following principles: 1) avoidance of incentives to take unnecessary risk, 2) taxpayer return, 3) appropriate allocation among the components of compensation, 4) appropriate portion of performance-based compensation, 5) comparable structures and payments, and 6) employee contribution to TARP recipient value.

Feinberg is a lawyer who has worked for the federal government, and more recently has headed his own law firm. He is perhaps best known for his role as Special Master in charge of dispensing billions of dollars to victims of the 9/11 attacks. Feinberg, however, apparently has no experience working at financial institutions, insurance companies, or car manufacturers, and yet he will be setting pay for over 100 employees at each of seven companies in these industries.

The labor market in the banking industry is highly competitive, with certain institutions - notably foreign banks - aggressively pursuing employees of banks that received TARP money. Will Feinberg allow these companies to pay their highly compensated employees enough to prevent them from jumping ship? The two car companies subject to the Special Master’s oversight are winding their way through bankruptcy court and are trying to reinvent themselves to become competitive in a highly volatile industry. What is the appropriate pay for the CEO of a car company, once the crown jewel of American manufacturing, which is feverishly switching gears to build cars that people want? The six principles mentioned above will help, but they will get Feinberg only so far. I question whether Feinberg has the proper experience or can possibly acquire all the necessary information about the banking, insurance and car industries to deem what constitutes appropriate pay for the affected highly compensated employees.

Tuesday, July 7, 2009

Rules of Revolution

The thesis is as follows: from the standpoint of international law, national sovereignty must be viewed as a flexible concept when self-determination by a people of a nation is in question in times of outbreaks of internal violence directly tied to the very question of people’s self-determination – in other words – in times of revolution. That is, the international community has a right to breach the otherwise sovereign borders of a state (peacekeeping forces, etc) in order to minimize human violence, and to prevent violent oppression of the revolting people by the government’s armed forces.


The reasoning is as follows: government derives its legitimacy from a choice made by the people to have that government. At times, political circumstances turn in such a way that a substantial number of people are dissatisfied with their government, AND are unable to change that government through peaceful, lawful means (e.g.: election, even one decided by a Supreme Court, which is still an institution of law). During such times, people turn to self-help and try to change their form of government through revolution. Unfortunately, too frequently the government has control over the armed forces and is able to forcefully suppress change and political dissent. When the government has to use force to secure people’s compliance with it, the government divests itself of its fundamental legitimacy. A nation without a government is still a sovereign nation, and the international community has two choices at that point: do nothing and let the revolution and bloodshed take its natural course, or intervene (again, e.g.: peacekeeping forces) and mediate the set-up of a replacement government while also providing the people with protection against violence possibly perpetrated on the people by their old regime.


Today, there are many NGOs that work in foreign countries and assist them in setting up their legal and political systems. The international community ought to recognize the tremendous importance of this type of work, and, in times when a country breaks out into violence, enable armed peacekeeping envoys to penetrate an evolving nation’s sovereignty to ensure the protection of the first and foremost human right: the right to life – even if one is a revolutionary otherwise willing to sacrifice it. From a moral standpoint, we should not stand by idly and watch other people sacrificing their lives in the name of freedom, and while the peacekeeping/envoy option may not be a great one (hey, this is my first crack at this!), the United Nations should consider other formal approaches to intervening in the affairs of sister states whose people seek a more perfect expression of freedom.


This thought-process was triggered by the current crisis in Iran, so let’s consider how this might play out. We have unrest by a significant number of the people, a law-less election, violent clamping down of the protesters by the government controlling the armed forces, loss of life, and, a key factor – lack of legal recourse and inability of the people to resolve the electoral dispute by application of law. The UN is currently being petitioned to send “envoys” to Iran to mediate the crisis; however, there is seldom any discussion of use of UN military force to stand up to the government’s en masse use of the military against its own citizenry.


There is a big part of me that thinks that the current crisis in Iran would satisfy the threshold criteria, as set forth above, for international use of force aimed at stabilizing the situation – a coalition of envoys, that is, who will oversee a re-election, and perhaps oversee a referendum on certain parts of the Iranian Constitution, such as the part granting unchecked power to one Supreme Leader. Yet, there is also a big part of me that feels such an approach too intrusive under the circumstances, and possibly unwelcome and counterproductive. In fact, I could imagine an argument that the Supreme Leader’s call of the Iranian election IS application of legal process – because the Supreme Leader is empowered by the Iranian Constitution to have the power to make that call, which means that the law prevailed and the protesters ought to go home. The problem, of course, is that the protesters are not going home, and those who are – are quite possibly doing so out of fear of death rather than a truly voluntary choice to consent to the government’s ruling.


So, at the end of the day, I am not ultimately willing to make this call. However, I do think that the United Nations ought to consider very strongly various formalized collective responses to brewing revolutions, including use of military peacekeeping forces, for the purpose of preserving and protecting human life. The UN’s approach right now is ad hoc and there is little thought (that I’m aware of) given to formalizing a set of rules and criteria that would trigger a right to intervene in the affairs of sovereign nations the governments of which use violence to suppress the people’s dissent, which governments, therefore, become illegitimate. We have legal rules for war – and the creation of those rules was motivated by a self-evident need to protect human life and other rights in times of great crisis; we should have rules for revolution – for the very same reasons.


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Gonna change my way of thinking.

One commentator (thanks for the tip, Stef!) recently suggested that the Iranian Constitution’s vesting of ultimate authority in the Supreme Leader is analogous to the Divine Right of Kings. One respondent (number 3) to that commentator has cautioned that “the Iranian Constitution… has rather deep intrusions of democratic principles[; it] repeatedly references democratic ideals in interesting and somewhat surprising ways,” citing, for example, the importance attributed by the Constitution to the public will, as it is expressed by public elections. This basic tenet of democracy -- self-determination by popular electoral will -- is indeed decidedly sophisticated from the viewpoint of institutional political maturity. However, I would argue that the very existence of a Supreme Leader whose final judgment is unquestionable because it is explicitly tied to the pronouncements of a higher-than-human authority reduces the “deep intrusions of democracy” in the Iranian Constitution to an aspirational ideal at best, and at worst - to mere lip service.

The recent electoral crisis in Iran is an illustration: despite extensive and strenuous protest by the very people who are supposedly empowered to self-determine their political fate, so far it is the word of the Supreme Leader that is prevailing. Some have pointed out that the recent unrest in Iran is likely to spell a serious change for the Iranian regime. Indeed, determination by the authority of the people, by its very nature, is incompatible with determination by the authority of a being other than the people and it is precisely this basic incompatibility that is behind the intuition concerning the impending regime change in Iran.

However, it is unclear exactly what kinds of (presumably democratic) institutions will replace Iran ’s current irreconcilable marriage between democratic choice and divine power, or, perhaps more importantly, how that change may be peacefully implemented. It is ironic enough that the people’s revolution of 1979 replaced an actual king with a leader possessing a divine right of kings; it would be more ironic and possibly quite tragic if another (armed) revolution were necessary to purge the remnants of divinity (that currently controls the armed forces) from the political framework to make room for rule of truly democratic (read: non-divine, people-controlled, in a word - secular) law, even if that law makes a respectful nod to religion (as it would have to in Iran). Allahu Akbar because the people's votes count.

Ultimately, what this discussion aims to stimulate and preface is a rethinking of certain aspects of international law, especially those aspects pertaining to nations’ rights to interfere in the affairs of other nations (see also previous post re: need for a flexible definition of national sovereignty during times of internal national violence.) Certain philosophical considerations do indeed justify, and in fact demand international attention to (and I would argue, at times, intense international involvement in) major transformative political events within any particular country, to facilitate the peaceful and lawful nature of these transformations, minimizing violence and loss of human life that too frequently accompanies them. International law can and should be used to challenge the necessity for coincidence of major political transformations with civilian bloodshed.

Monday, July 6, 2009

More (?!) Bank Closings and New Rules for Private Equity Buyers

Is this a visual alarm bell, or just an economic system purging itself? As of Thursday, the total number of banks closed since Fall 2008 is greater than 75. At the end of Q109, the FDIC had 305 banks with $200 billion in assets on its list of "problem institutions." Interestingly, in concert with Thursday's seizures, the FDIC proposed new rules for private equity groups purchasing the banks. The online discussion since has been pretty robust.

The FDIC is juggling conflicting goals here: trying to entice the deep pocket liquidity of private equity buyers, while structuring the purchase and performance of the newly acquired banks so that future systemic problems are avoided. Critics charge that the move will deter the very private equity the FDIC is courting. Among the requirements generating the most discussion is the proposal that buyers maintain a 15% leverage ratio after they purchase the bank.
Briefly, leverage ratios are useful in understanding how a bank uses its assets, as well as predicting whether that bank can meet its financial obligations. The concept is straight-forward enough: you have $10,000 of your own money at 5% anticipated gain. Your profit is $500. But if you fully leverage yourself and borrow someone else's $9,999 against your own $10,000, your profit doubles to $1,000 (presuming the same 5% anticipated gain). The profit to be gained from more and more leverage - all on the back of your original $10,000 investment - is understandably attractive. The problem is when losses occur and downside risk has not been provided for. Plenty of commentators have identified leverage as a key factor contributing to the ongoing economic snap. The FDIC proposed leverage ratio and the subsequent pushback illustrates the indecision of what to do with this issue moving forward ...

Other proposed requirements for private equity buyers include: owning the purchased bank for at least three years; not lending to affiliates, including buyers' own portfolio companies; and disclosing buyer details, such as ownership. The proposal is subject to a 30-day comment period. This is a really intriguing matter for me, so although this post strikes more of an FYI tone, I will continue to follow the issue and update the blawg as the next several weeks unfold.


Hat tip: Kevin LaCroix at The D & O Diary.

(
Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons).

Friday, July 3, 2009

In Case You Missed It This Week


Pluto's astrological transit in Capricorn is messing with the political and legal environment. Co-Op.

Madoff > than Skilling. Bloomberg. [UPDATE].

Do you know what the official name of Rhode Island State is? Hint: it's not Rhode Island. NYTimes.

Is the guy a bum, or is this a modern variation of debtors' prison? NYTimes.

Law firms are not the only legal actors in the industry using the deferral mechanism. JDJournal.

Newspapers are expanding the family of products and services they offer. [UPDATE: here and here].


(Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons).

Wednesday, July 1, 2009

How likely is recouping executive compensation, really?

Okay - so Americans used to carte-blanche corporate executives making a lot of money; bankers making a lot of money; and that errant as-seen-on-tv-product-guy making a lot of money. Before the current economic snap, no one really cared; or, at least, they didn’t care enough to litigate over it. Along comes Fall 2008, and since, each public disclosure of a corporate pay package inevitably throws the media cycle into full whirl, encouraging shareholders and creditors to litigate to recoup executive compensation paid, including bonuses. Because it’s really just that simple, right? No, it so is not.

Allen and I wrote a paper that acts as a solid foundation primer for counsel on both sides of this issue, Litigation and Recoupment of Executive Compensation (forthcoming). I wrote several sections, one which discussed New York State case law on the matter. There are a number of different legal avenues moving parties could take, and I will discuss a few here. As a threshold matter, understand plaintiffs have their work cut out for them.

Grasso
Everyone in Manhattan knows about Richard Grasso. He was the former Chairman and CEO of the NYSE when it was organized as a not-for-profit entity. At the time of his departure in 2003, he had been party to a compensation agreement paying him $ 184 million over the course of five years (Grasso’s bonus in 2002 was $ 10.6 million). Then Attorney General Eliot Spitzer brought six claims against Grasso in an attempt to recoup the compensation. The claims ultimately failed; several as a result of loss standing on the Attorney General’s part (mid-litigation, the NYSE transformed into a for-profit corporation). The remaining claims failed because they did not satisfy the mental element of bad faith or knowledge, per New York’s Not-For-Profit Law. This bad faith or knowledge element mirrors the protection for-profit corporate actors enjoy at common law under the business judgment rule.


Corporate Waste
Basically, no matter how large or seemingly unreasonable the compensation awarded may be, if there is some relationship to the job performed – responsibilities and complexity of obligations, industry standards, expertise and experience – precedent suggests a New York court will not disturb a properly-determined compensation award absent bad faith or fraud. (n. 1). Precedent that does recoup executive compensation under a claim of corporate waste is quite old and involves smaller executive compensation packages than is the 2009 norm. As corporate counsel remarked to me recently, “When you’re talking hundreds of millions of dollars in cash flow each year, what is a $ 20 million compensation reward?”

Attorney General Andrew Cuomo’s Campaign for Governor of New York
Just a joke, Mr. Attorney General … At different points since the Fall of 2008, the Attorney General’s office has effectively leveraged The Martin Act and Fraudulent Conveyance claims to resolve very-public issues of executive compensation.

The Martin Act is one of New York’s blue sky provisions, giving the Attorney General broad powers to investigate and litigate matters of fraud where the sale of securities is involved. Attorney General Cuomo successfully relied on The Martin Act earlier this year to compel former Merrill Lynch CEO John Thain to divulge who received the Merrill bonuses prior to the Bank of America merger.

Fraudulent conveyance in New York is codified by statute, and allows creditors to recoup from transferees and beneficiaries any amounts transferred. Attorney General Cuomo has twice successfully leveraged the threat of fraudulent conveyance against American International Group. First in the fall of 2008, Cuomo secured AIG’s agreement to freeze salaries and bonuses. Then again in early 2009, Cuomo subpoenaed the names of the AIG employees receiving bonuses in light of further government subsidy. The move resulted in fifteen of the twenty highest bonus recipients voluntarily forfeiting their award. To what degree these results were achieved by the strength of the fraudulent conveyance claim, or by the heft of the Attorney General, is left for other legal observers to say.

The topic of executive compensation is interesting, and will certainly be discussed ad nauseam moving forward in the next several years. I will periodically revisit pieces of the research document Allen and I put together, but will also develop side inquiries in greater depth as this blawg moves through the summer.

And so good luck, you-activist-angry-plaintiffs-You … you’re going to need it.


n. 1: See e.g. Heller v. Boylan, 29N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. 1941). View full post and comment string ...